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Abstract
Within an experimental financial market, we study how information about the true divi-
dend of an asset (that is either high or low), which is available to some traders, is absorbed
in the asset’s price when all traders have access to past trading prices of another asset
that was traded in a separate market. We consider two treatments: in one, the dividends
of the two assets are independent; in the other, they are positively correlated. Our main
result is that market efficiency is worse in some instances in the correlated treatment,
which highlights that the information linkage between markets can obstruct the infor-
mation transmission from the informed to the uninformed traders. More specifically, if
the dividend of the own asset is high, prices reasonably converge towards the rational
expectations equilibrium but are too low in the correlated treatment if the dividend in
the other market is low. If the dividend of the own asset is low, asset prices are further
away from rational expectations equilibrium if dividends are correlated, which is mainly
caused by the instances where prices in the other market were high.
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The ability of financial markets to correctly aggregate information held by traders into market
prices has received considerable attention in economics and finance. According to the efficient-
market hypothesis (Hayek, 1945; Muth, 1961; Fama, 1970), asset prices perfectly reflect all
available information and has as direct implication that it is impossible for traders to “beat the
market”. While the early empirical literature found support for this hypothesis (Fama, 1965,
1970; Scholes, 1972), later research produced contradicting evidences (De Bondt & Thaler,
1985; Ito et al., 1998; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). Given that it is not possible to control in
the field for the private information of the market participants, laboratory experiments have
been found a useful tool to complement the theoretical and empirical research on market
efficiency. The main insights from the early experimental literature on asset pricing is that
markets have some capacity to incorporate private information of traders (Forsythe et al.,
1982; Plott & Sunder, 1982, 1988; Forsythe & Lundholm, 1990); however, there are also
several studies that report a substantial divergence between market prices and underlying
fundamentals (Camerer & Weigelt, 1991; O’Brien & Srivastava, 1991; Hanson et al., 2006;
Huber et al., 2011; Page & Siemroth, 2017 and 2018; Corgnet et al., 2018, 2019 and 2020).
This suggests that more research is needed in order to better understand the performance of
experimental asset markets.
Our study, which is essentially based on Plott and Sunder (1988), focuses on contagion
in continuous time double auction markets, in the sense that trade information from one
market may obstruct a correct price formation in another market. To implement this basic
idea, we consider two assets called asset A and asset B. The assets are traded in completely
separated markets: traders in market A trade only asset A and traders in market B only trade
asset B. Asset B commonly pays either a high or a low dividend (each with probability one-
half). Prior to trading, some of the market B participants are perfectly informed about the
actual dividend of asset B. The presence of perfectly informed insiders is common knowledge.
Borrowing is unlimited at no interest and short sales are prohibited. The dividend of asset B
does not depend on that of asset A, and thus one should think of asset B as being completely
isolated from asset A. Plott and Sunder (1988) refer to this type of single asset market as
“series C”. Several studies have reported evidence that “series C” markets fail to converge
to the rational expectations equilibrium; see, for example, Biais et al. (2005), Hanson et al.
(2006), Veiga and Vorsatz (2009, 2010), and Corgnet et al. (2019). In particular, there tends
to be a difficulty in incorporating negative information; that is, prices may end up too high
if the asset pays a low dividend. If the dividend is high, on the other hand, one can expect
prices to converge to the rational expectations equilibrium.
Market A opens after market B has closed, and the traders in market A have access to the
prices of asset B, but without knowing the true dividend of asset B. Otherwise, market A has
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the same structure as market B. The dividend of asset A, however, which is also either high or
low, may depend on that of asset B. In treatment Correlation (treatment C henceforth) the
dividend of asset A coincides with that of asset B with probability 0.7. In treatment Baseline
(treatment B henceforth), the dividend of asset A does not depend on the dividend of asset
B: for each possible dividend of asset B, low or high, there is a 50% chance that the actual
dividend of asset A is high.
Our main research objective regards the between-treatments comparisons of the price of
asset A. From a theoretical point of view, in treatment B, information from market B is not
informative. For treatment C this is less obvious. Indeed, ex ante prices from market B
provide valuable information with regards to asset A’s dividend. In particular, from a prior
information equilibrium perspective where traders only consider their own private information
and ignore all information transmission through prices within market A, a higher price of
asset B, triggered through a high dividend of asset B, increases the expected dividend of the
uninformed traders in market A. As a consequence, if the actual dividend of asset A is low,
the informed traders are able to sell their shares at higher prices to the uninformed when
compared with treatment B. However, since there is no aggregate uncertainty due to the
presence of perfectly informed insiders, information about prices from market B has no effect
on the price of asset A according to the rational expectations equilibrium.
We first summarize our main results for the case when the dividend of asset A is high.
Market A works reasonably well with prices gradually moving into the direction of the rational
expectations equilibrium, independently of whether (or not) the dividend of asset B is low or
high. If the dividend of both assets is high, then prices are not significantly different between
treatments. However, if the dividend of asset B is low (and asset A pays a high dividend),
then prices are significantly higher in treatment B than in treatment C. This means that the
correlated asset structure has a detriment effect on market efficiency. The plausible channel
for this result, in fact the one our design intends to capture, is that low prices of asset B
are observed in market A (due to the fact that the dividend of asset B is low) and that
this bad signal about the dividend of asset A causes that some of the uninformed traders in
market A are willing to sell their shares at lower prices in treatment C than in treatment
B. As a consequence, the informed traders, who are on the buying side of the market when
the dividend of asset A is high, are able to buy shares of asset A from the uninformed, at
relatively lower prices in treatment C. Since every transaction between an informed and an
uninformed trader leads to a gain for the informed and a loss for the uninformed (dividends
are common), the consequence would be that the difference between the average payoff of the
informed and the average payoff of the uninformed traders is larger in treatment C than in
treatment B. While the data hints into this direction, we find that the payoff difference is
not significantly different between treatments. This suggests that prices differences between
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treatments are caused by noise trading, that is, transactions between two uninformed traders.
If the dividend of asset A is low, asset prices are far too high when compared with the
rational expectations equilibrium. Prices are higher in treatment C than in treatment B
independently of the dividend of asset B being high (the treatment effect is highly significant)
or low (the treatment effect is not significant). Remarkably, in treatment C, the price of asset
A at the end of a trading period is in both cases on average higher than the ex ante expected
dividend, that is, the posterior probability that the dividend of asset A is high is greater
than 0.5. This highlights that prices do not transmit any information from the insiders to
the uninformed when the dividend of asset A is low. We also find that the payoff difference
between the insiders and the uninformed traders is larger in treatment C than in treatment
B, however the difference is not significant, neither for a low nor for a high dividend of asset
B. Since the informed sell shares to the uninformed when the dividend of asset A is low, the
informed sell in both treatments at roughly the same prices, which implies that the higher
prices in treatment C are again rather caused by noise trading between the uninformed.
While informational spillover effects between parallel markets have found some attention
within the experimental financial markets literature, this literature has mainly focussed on
settings where there is a strong linkage, and hence arbitraging opportunities, between the
two markets (such as, Fisher & Kelly, 2000; Qi & Ochs, 2009; Ackert et al., 2011). One
exception is Vardanyan (2017) where contagion of crisis information from one market to the
other is explored. This study finds that a sudden price drop (mimicking a crisis effect) in one
market causes a price drop in the other market and attributes it mainly to bandwagon effects
(Calvo & Reinhart, 1996) and less to strategic uncertainty (Ahnert & Bertsch, 2013); though,
does not rule out other possible channels, such as sunspot effects (Jevons, 1978). Vardanyan
(2017) relates most to our treatment B in that there is no ex ante correlation between the
two markets. Our finding for treatment B, however, differs from that of Vardanyan (2017):
we find no spillover effects as the price in market A does not depend on the observed price
of asset B. The reason we conclude differently is likely due to two design differences: in our
set-up market A is not run simultaneous with market B, and market B does not produce
sudden extreme price drops. To further explore this, one could consider the situation where
market A traders observe market B trading prices as if market B is running in parallel.
2 Laboratory experiment
2.1 Design
In our experiments, subjects assume the role of traders who can exchange shares of an asset in
a continuous time double auction. The presence of few insiders and the fact that these receive
perfect information is commonly known by all traders in the market. Our main objective is
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to study how private information of these insiders is incorporated into prices at which the
shares are traded, and how information dissemination is affected by prices in other parallel,
possibly correlated, markets. In our simple setting with correlated assets, some subjects are
assumed to be in country A, while others are in country B. We refer to the asset traded in
country A as asset A. Similarly, the asset traded in country B is called asset B. Traders can
only act in the market of the country they belong to. So, subjects in country A trade asset A
in market A, and subjects in country B trade asset B in market B. Traders in country B do
not receive any information about market A, in fact, they do not even know its existence, but
traders in country A receive information about past prices in market B. Next, we describe
the functioning of the markets in detail.
Country B. Ten subjects trade asset B that yields a high (150 ECU) or a low (50 ECU)
dividend – each with 50% chance. Three of the ten traders are randomly selected upfront
(i.e., before the market opens) and learn whether the actual dividend is high or low.
Each trader is endowed with four shares of the asset and 6,000 ECU of cash. This cash
amount is provided as an interest-free loan, and allows traders to buy additional shares. In
fact, since each trader can acquire an additional 36 shares at the maximum price of 150 ECU
each, the loan provided is large enough for a trader to buy all existing shares. The loan is
automatically returned once the market closes.
Once the market opens, for a period of 240 seconds, subjects can trade shares of asset B
by posting buy (bid prices) and sell orders (ask prices). We do not allow for short sales. At
any moment, traders can have at most one standing buy and one standing sell order (for a
single share each), but these can be updated in continuous time. The order book is public and
trades are automatically liquidated. Prices at which trades take place are shown graphically in
continuous time. After the market closes, all traders (i.e. also the seven initially uninformed
traders) learn the actual dividend of the asset and their earnings. All this is commonly known.
Country A. Conditions in country A are identical to those in country B apart from the
following aspects. Most notably, there is possibly a linkage between asset A and asset B.
Traders in country A know that if the actual dividend of asset B is high (low), then the
dividend of asset A is high (low) with probability p ≥ 0.5. No trader in country A has private
information about the actual dividend of asset B, but the prices of all trades in market B are
graphically shown to all traders in market A. This corresponds to the situation when market
A opens after market B closed. Once market A closes, traders in country A learn the actual
dividend of both asset A and asset B.
There are two treatments. In treatment Baseline (B), market A is independent of market
B (p = 0.5). In treatment Correlated (C), p = 0.7, so that the dividend of asset A depends
positively on the dividend of asset B.
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2.2 Procedures
We ran market B with three different groups and each of the two country A treatments with
six different groups. Therefore, 150 different subjects participated in the experiment in total.
Market B was run upfront in an isolated fashion and the results were then used in the sessions
for market A. Group 1 of market B was matched with groups 1 and 4 of market A, group 2
of market B was matched with groups 2 and 5 of market A, and group 3 of market B was
matched with groups 3 and 6 of market A.
Each group traded the asset for thirteen rounds. The first round (period 0) was a practice
round and the remaining twelve rounds (periods 1 to 12) were subject to monetary incentives
with earnings being accumulated over these twelve rounds. At the beginning of each round,
the dividend for the asset was drawn anew, as were the three subjects that would learn the
actual dividend of the corresponding asset. In the practice round, no-one was informed about
the actual dividend. It was not possible to carry over shares or cash from one period to the
next one in order to keep observations as independent as possible.
Sessions took place in January–February 2020 in the Laboratory for Research in Be-
havioural Experimental Economics (LINEEX) at the University of Valencia. Students of the
University of Valencia from various disciplines were recruited to participate in one of the three
sessions. In the first session, in late January, we ran market B. After that, in February, we
ran two sessions, one for each treatment.
During the sessions, participants were situated in isolated work-spaces accommodated
with a computer. Instructions were read aloud, were displayed on their computer screens,
and provided on paper for later referencing. Texts were phrased as neutrally as possible (e.g.,
states related to the dividend were not called high and low, but W and Z for Country B and
X and Y for Country A). All interactions took place via the computers that were connected
to a central server, using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Before the trading phase started, all
participants had to correctly answer a list of control questions which tested their understand-
ing of the instructions. After the final trading period, a post-experimental questionnaire
followed in which we elicited information on participants’ gender and, using monetary incen-
tives, their risk attitudes (Holt & Laury, 2002), attention levels using the cognitive reflection
test (Frederick, 2005; Sirota & Juanchich, 2018) and risk literacies (Cokely et al., 2012). Ses-
sions concluded with participants receiving their earnings, with the accumulated earnings in
the twelve incentivized trading rounds being exchanged for Euros at an exchange rate equal-
izing 400 ECUs to 1 Euro. A typical session lasted a bit less than two hours and average
earnings were about 21 Euros (including 6 Euros show-up fee). It occasionally occured that
a trader made a loss in a period, but no subject went bankrupt over the course of the whole
experiment. The experiment found ethical approval from University of Otago Human Ethics
Committee (reference number D20/017).
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2.3 Hypotheses
In the literature on experimental financial markets, the rational expectations and the prior
information equilibria have been applied extensively. According to the rational expectations
equilibrium, prices incorporate all information available to the traders. In our markets, the
informed traders receive a perfect signal, which implies that there is no aggregate uncertainty.
The equilibrium price is thus always equal to the actual dividend of the asset. In the prior
information equilibrium each trader calculates, before the market opens, the expected value
of the asset given her private information. The trader then sells the asset at prices above this
valuation and buys it at prices below, thereby ignoring all information that may be conveyed
through prices. The equilibrium price, which is found by intersecting the aggregate supply
and demand curves, turns out to be equal to the highest valuation of the two types of traders.
Correlated Benchmark
RE PI RE PI
HH 150 150 150 150
HL 150 150 150 150
LH 50 120 50 100
LL 50 100 50 100
Table 1: Rational expectations (RE) and prior information (PI) equilibria for market A.
Table 1 shows the two equilibria in market A for each possible state s ∈ {HH,HL,LH,LL}.
In notation s = xy, x stands for the actual dividend of asset A (high or low) and y for the ac-
tual dividend of asset B (high or low). Then, pTs is the price of asset A in state s of treatment
T ∈ {B,C}. With respect to market B, there are only two states – the dividend is either high
or low – so we indicate prices of asset B by qH (the dividend is high) and qL (the dividend is
low), respectively. Generically, we write qd.
We have already indicated that in the rational expectations equilibrium, the price in mar-
ket A is equal to the actual dividend, which highlights that traders rather rely on the superior
information disseminated in market A instead of considering the (less reliable) information
from market B. Next, we determine the prior information equilibrium in market A. If the
dividend of asset A is high, the informed traders assign a value of 150 to the asset, which is
the maximum valuation possible. Therefore, the prior information equilibrium price is equal
to 150. If the dividend of asset A is low, the informed traders assign a value of 50 to the
asset, which is the minimum valuation possible. The prior information equilibrium price must
thus coincide with the valuation of the uninformed traders. The valuation of the uninformed
traders of asset A in treatment C is
(0.7 · 150 + 0.3 · 50) · µ+ (0.3 · 150 + 0.7 · 50) · (1− µ) = 80 + 40 · µ
where µ is the belief of an uninformed trader that the dividend of asset B is high upon
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observing the outcome of market B. In order to determine the belief µ, we have to know the
price traders observe in market B in the prior information equilibrium. Following a similar
argument as before, qH = 150 in the prior information equilibrium of market B. If the actual
dividend of asset B is low, the prior information equilibrium price in market B corresponds
to the valuations of the uninformed traders, who assign a value of 150 · 0.5 + 50 · 0.5 = 100 to
asset B. So, qL = 100. Finally, we have to be explicit about how traders translate the market
B price into the belief µ. A straightforward way is to interpret prices of asset B as the market





As a consequence, in equilibrium, the belief of an uninformed trader in market A that the
actual dividend of asset B is high when, in fact, the actual dividend is high (low) equals
µ = 1 (µ = 0.5). This implies that in the prior information equilibrium of market A, pCLH =
80 + 40 · 1 = 120 and pCLL = 80 + 40 · 0.5 = 100. Finally, the valuation of the uninformed
market A traders in treatment B is always
(0.5 · 150 + 0.5 · 50) · µ+ (0.5 · 150 + 0.5 · 50) · (1− µ) = 100,
which is independent of the belief µ and the actual dividend of asset B. The definition of the
prior information equilibrium for asset A is essentially based on the assumption that traders
take the observed price in market B as a linear measure of the unknown probability that the
actual dividend of asset B is high. The consequence is that the beliefs of the uninformed
traders in market A are consistent with the beliefs of the traders in market B who hold the
highest valuation.
The main objective of the experiment is to analyze whether subjects condition their be-
havior in market A on market B prices, which clearly constitutes a violation of the rational
expectations equilibrium. This possibility is partly incorporated in the prior information
equilibrium; i.e, the equilibrium price of market A in treatment C is higher in state LH than
in state LL and the equilibrium price of market A in state LH is higher in treatment C than
in treatment B. However from a behavioral point of view one can think of further, probably
even stronger violations of the rational expectations equilibrium. For example, if the actual
dividend of asset A is high, the prior information equilibrium price is 150. Intuitively, one can
think that since there is competition between the informed traders, these have to bid prices
up in order to make sure gains until the equilibrium price is reached. However, in treatment
C, the information the uninformed traders obtain in state HL about market B probably sig-
nals a low dividend of asset A, so they may be inclined to sell their shares at lower prices (in
comparison with state HH). So, one cannot exclude that in treatment C, prices are actually
lower in state HL than in HH. This is not anticipated by the prior information equilibrium.
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At the same time, and regarding between-treatments comparisons, it can be conjectured that
prices in state s = xH, x ∈ {H,L}, are higher in treatment C than in treatment B. The un-
derlying idea is that the uninformed traders in market A see themselves reinforced to buy the
asset in treatment C in comparison to treatment B whenever the observed prices in market
B signal a high value of asset B. Similarly, prices in state s = xL, x ∈ {H,L} may be lower
in treatment C than in treatment B.
In Hypothesis H1, possible inequalities are expressed in a weak sense in order to accom-
modate the rational expectations equilibrium, the prior information equilibrium, and our
behavioral hypotheses in a single set of equations. Note that there is evidence of contagion,
spillover effects from market B to market A, whenever some of the weak inequalities that
involve treatment C hold strictly.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). pCHH ≥ pBHH = pBHL ≥ pCHL and pCLH ≥ pBLH = pBLL ≥ pCLL.
Hypothesis H1 has direct consequences on profits. Let πTI (s) be the average payoff of
all informed traders in treatment T ∈ {C,B} when the actual state in market A is s ∈
{HH,HL,LH,LL}. The corresponding average payoff of all uninformed traders is πTU (s).
Due to private information, it is reasonable to expect that dTs ≡ πTI (s) − πTU (s) ≥ 0. In
fact, dTs should only be equal to zero if prices converge quickly to the rational expectations
equilibrium or if there is no trade at all. Then, if the dividend of asset A is high, the informed
are expected to buy shares from the uninformed. And, the gains from buying these shares
are higher for lower prices of asset A, which causes dTs to be decreasing in the price of asset
A. On the other hand, if the dividend of asset A is low, then the informed sell shares to the
uninformed. Thus, dTs is increasing in the price of asset A. This argument, when combined
with Hypothesis H1, leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). dCHH ≤ dBHH = dBHL ≤ dCHL and dCLH ≥ dBLH = dBLL ≥ dCLL.
3 Results
3.1 Market B
Subjects participating in a country A session have access to the price paths of market B while
trading. Since, by Hypothesis H1, the trading activity in market A is expected to be affected
by market B prices in treatment C and since treatment B controls for framing effects – it
cannot be ruled out a priori that the simple display of market B prices, even though dividends
are known to be uncorrelated, has influences on behavior –, it is crucial that the outcome of
the market B sessions is rationalizable, as it is not desired that market A is affected by some
kind of abnormal market B results. In fact, it would be difficult to explain subject behavior
in market B if prices were higher for the low than for high dividend or if the informed traders
earned less than the uninformed.
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Figure 1 shows the average price paths in market B, and we next describe shortly how
these price paths are constructed. We first create for each trading period a time series that
indicates for each time stamp t (in seconds) the last price at which a trade took place. For
example, if there is a trade when the market is open for 35 seconds at a price of 110 ECU and
the next trade occurs 10 seconds later at a price of 120 ECU, then the time series indicates a
price of 110 ECU for all t ∈ {35, 36, 37, . . . , 44} and changes at t = 45 to 120 ECU. Figure 1














































































































































● ●High dividend Low dividend
Figure 1: Average price paths in market B.
It can first be acknowledged from Figure 1 that information is very well disseminated by
market B if the dividend is high. The average price path for the high dividend starts at a
value of about 110 ECU and increases constantly over time. The slope of the price path is
steep in the beginning and then flattens, which suggests convergence. The average price over
the last 30 seconds of a trading period is 140 ECU, which is close but not equal to the actual
dividend of 150 ECU. Second, and regarding the case of a low dividend for asset B, it has
been observed in other studies (i.e., Veiga and Vorsatz, 2009 and 2010) that markets similar
to those of market B have problems to converge to the rational expectations equilibrium. One
possibility is that the absence of short sales avoids that the negative information of the insiders
is sufficiently incorporated in prices. We observe something very similar in market B, as the
average price path converges to a price that is closer to the prior information equilibrium than
to the rational expectations equilibrium. In that context it is worth mentioning that prices
are nevertheless informative to at least some extent. The prior information equilibrium price
is 100 ECU, while the average price over the last 30 seconds of a trading period is 88 ECU.
1All individual trades for market B are shown graphically in the appendix in Figure 3. One obtains the
price paths at the group level by filling the gaps for the time stamps where no trade took place.
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Finally, we emphasize that the findings are robust for our three trading groups in the sense
that final trading prices in state H are consistently above those in state L.
Regarding payoffs we would like to note that the value of information is almost the same
for both dividends. If the dividend of asset B is low, the average per round payoff of an
informed trader is 313 ECU, while an uninformed trader earns on average 151 ECU per
round. The average per round difference between an informed and an uninformed trader is
thus 162 ECU. If the dividend of asset B is high, an informed trader gets on average 712
ECU per round. Since the per round payoff of an uninformed trader is only 551 ECU in this
case, the difference amounts to 161 ECU. Both the descriptive analysis of the prices and the
descriptive analysis of the payoffs in market B indicate that subjects behaved “regularly” in
these experimental sessions. Consequently, we can exclude the possibility that the outcome
of market A is driven by some kind of abnormality in market B.
3.2 Market A: Prices
Figure 2 presents, in different panels for different states, the average sequence of contract
prices in market A, aggregated over all groups and rounds, for both treatments. For example,
the top-left panel shows the price paths in both treatments for the state HH. The price paths










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































● ●Treatment B Treatment C
Figure 2: Average price paths in market A.
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First, if the dividend of asset A is high (the two panels on the top), then the ranking of
the average price paths is completely in line with Hypothesis H1. In particular, at the end
of the trading period, there is almost no visible difference between HH and HL in treatment
B. In fact, the average price over the last 30 seconds of a round equals 127 ECU in state HH
and 128 ECU in state HL. Moreover, as predicted, in state HH, the average price path in
treatment C is always above the one from treatment B; and, in state HL, the average price
path in treatment C is below the one from treatment B. In treatment C, the average price
in the last 30 seconds of a round is 138 ECU in state HH and 118 ECU in state HL.
Second, if the dividend of asset A is low (the two panels at the bottom), the relative
ordering of the average price paths is less in line with Hypothesis H1. The average price
paths in treatment C are in both panels above the ones from treatment B, while according
to Hypothesis H1, this should be so for state LH but not for LL. Also, in treatment C,
even though the average price path in state LH tends, as predicted, to be above the one
from LL, there is only a minor difference at the end of the trading period. The average price
over the last 30 seconds of a round equals 112 ECU in state LH and 104 ECU in state LL.
So, even though the difference goes in the correct direction, it is not very pronounced once
prices settle down. Finally, in treatment B, there is a better convergence to the rational
expectations equilibrium in state LH than in LL. The average price over the last 30 seconds
in a trading period is 74 ECU in state HL and 92 ECU in state LL. Obviously, due to the
absence of correlation between market A and market B, there should not be any significant
difference in treatment B.
We test Hypothesis H1 with the help of a panel data analysis. The model for the within-
treatments comparisons is
ykrt = β0 + β1 · DivBHighkr + β2 · Repetitionkr + εkrt, (1)
where ykrt is the price of asset A for group k in round r when the market is open for t seconds,
DivBHigh is a dummy variable that takes value 1 (0) if group k in market A faces in round r a
price path from market B that is associated with a high (low) asset B dividend, Repetition
accounts for possible learning effects between rounds in market A2, and εkrt is a normally
distributed error. Note that kr defines the cross-section index level of the panel.
Table 2 reports the estimation results for equation (1). The last two columns compare for
treatment B the price of asset A between the states HH and HL (third column) and between
LH and LL (last column). Since dividends are not correlated across markets, Hypothesis H1
states that there are no price differences, neither between HH and HL nor between LH
and LL. This is what we indeed find. For the comparison between HH and HL in the
2More precisely, if the true state for group k in round r is equal to s for the j-th time in the session, then
Repetitionkr = j.
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Treatment C Treatment B
HH vs HL LH vs LL HH vs HL LH vs LL
Intercept (β0) 107.386
∗∗∗ 126.566∗∗∗ 106.876∗∗∗ 112.883∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DivBHigh (β1) 16.692
∗∗ 7.891 2.929 −6.062
(0.016) (0.353) (0.531) (0.405)
Repetition (β2) 2.389 −1.431 8.141∗∗∗ −4.063∗∗
(0.273) (0.405) (0.000) (0.494)
Observations 36 36 41 31
Table 2: Panel data analysis (within-treatments comparisons). In parenthesis, we report two-sided
p-values. *** means statistically significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Standard errors are clustered
at the cross-section index level to allow for serial correlation. Since the estimation includes group
dummies, the intercept should be interpreted with care.
third column, β̂1 is 2.929, and the hypothesis that β1 = 0 cannot be rejected (the two-sided
p-value is 0.531). For the comparison between states LH and LL, the two-sided p-value of
the hypothesis that β1 = 0 equals 0.405. It is worth noting that Figure 2 suggests that the
comparison between HH and HL is not significant in treatment B (as we find), yet prices in
this treatment are substantially lower in LH than in LL. However, since the dummy variable
DivBHigh is not significant, there is no systematic price difference between LH and LL and
the difference in Figure 2 should be attributed to group specific effects. For example, Figure 5
in Appendix B shows that group 2 manages to converge often to the rational expectations
equilibrium in state LH, which has a considerable effect on the average price paths in Figure 2.
Finally, since the variable Repetition is highly significant and positive in the third and the
last column, we can conclude that in treatment B, there is learning in both HH and HL. And
the learning goes into the direction of the rational expectations equilibrium as β̂2 is positive
if the dividend in market A is high but negative if the dividend in market A is low.
Our hypothesis for the within-treatments comparisons in treatment C is that a higher
dividend of asset B should lead to weakly higher prices in market B (we have already corrob-
orated this basic idea in the data) and that due to the positive correlation of assets A and B,
these higher prices in market B translate into higher prices in market A. That is, the price in
state HH should be at least as high as in HL and the price in LH should be at least as high
as in LL. Figure 2 already indicated that both comparisons go in the correct direction, yet
the difference is only significant at the 5% level for the difference between HH and HL. In
fact, and as it can be seen from the first column of Table 2, the estimated difference between
states HH and HL amounts to 16.692 ECU, and the two-sided p-value of the associated test
that β1 = 0 is 0.016. The estimated price difference between states LH and LL on the other
hand is only 7.891 ECU, and this difference is not significant at the 5% level. There are no
learning effects between periods in this treatment.
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We summarize our findings thus far as follows:















We next focus on the between-treatments comparisons. The econometric model is now
ykrt = β0 + β1 · TreatmentCk + β2 · Repetitionkr + εkrt. (2)
The only difference with respect to the earlier model is that the dummy variable DivBHigh
is replaced by the dummy variable TreatmentC. This new dummy variable is 1 for groups
belonging to treatment C and 0 for those who face treatment B. The results from the panel
data analysis are presented in Table 3.
State
HH HL LH LL
Intercept (β0) 120.656
∗∗∗ 115.790∗∗∗ 115.012∗∗∗ 128.249∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TreatmentC (β1) 2.627 −18.937∗∗ 23.354∗∗∗ −0.217
(0.295) (0.020) (0.001) (0.955)
Repetition (β2) 5.946
∗∗∗ 3.740∗∗ −3.986∗∗ −2.860
(0.000) (0.047) (0.043) (0.214)
Observations 40 37 32 35
Table 3: Panel data analysis (between-treatments comparisons). In parenthesis, we report two-sided
p-values. *** means statistically significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Standard errors are clustered
at the cross-section index level to allow for serial correlation. Since the estimation includes group
dummies, the intercept should be interpreted with care.
In line with Hypothesis H1, prices are significantly lower in treatment C than in treatment
B in state HL (second column) and prices are significantly higher in treatment C than in
treatment B in state LH (third column). No significant differences between the two treat-
ments are found for the states HH and LL. Significant learning effects for states HH, HL,
and LH indicate that prices in these states are closer to the rational expectations equilibrium
in later rounds of a session.














According to Results R1 and R2, there is no binary comparison that contradicts Hypoth-
esis H1. At the same time, three effects suggest that the correlated asset structure affects
3Notation is as follows: a strict inequality is used whenever the two-sided p-value is at most 0.05, a weak
inequality is used whenever the two-sided p-value is between 0.05 and 0.10, an equality is used whenever the
two-sided p-value is at least 0.10.
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prices. First, in treatment C, the price in state HH is significantly higher than the price
in state HL. Second, in state LH, the price is significantly higher in treatment C than in
treatment B. And third, in state HL, the price is significantly lower in treatment C than
in treatment B. Note that the two significant between-treatments comparisons indicate that
the correlated asset structure worsens market efficiency.
3.3 Market A: Payoffs
Hypothesis H2, which is about the within- and between-treatments comparisons of the payoff
difference between the informed and the uninformed traders, is a direct consequence of Hy-
pothesis H1. The informed traders are expected to buy shares from the uninformed traders
if the dividend of asset A is high, but they should sell to the uninformed if asset A pays a
low dividend. So, lower prices are expected to be beneficial for the informed, at the cost of
the uninformed, when the asset A dividend is high. Similarly, higher prices are supposed
to be better for the informed when the dividend of asset A is low. Hypothesis H2 has been
formulated on the basis of Hypothesis H1 in the abstract, but at this point we can make use
of the actual price data from Results R1 and R2 in order to refine Hypothesis H2:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Regarding payoffs, Results R1 and R2 suggest that:






























Remember that we defined πTI (s) as the average payoff of the informed traders in treatment
T ∈ {C,B} when the actual state is s ∈ {HH,HL,LH,LL}. The average payoff of the
uninformed traders πTU (s) has been defined accordingly. Then, d
T
s ≡ πTI (s) − πTU (s) is the
difference between the average payoff of the informed and the uninformed in treatment T and
state s. Intuitively, the second part of Hypothesis H3 expresses thus the following argument.
We have seen that in states HL and LH, prices in treatment B are further away from the
rational expectations equilibrium than those in treatment C. It is therefore to be expected
that this price difference is reflected in the relative profits in the sense that the informed
traders have higher profits relative to the uninformed when the informed can gain more by
trading in the market. Table 4 shows the resulting numbers from our experiment.
State
HH HL LH LL
Treatment B 83.76 75.35 59.83 89.72
Treatment C 9.29 90.32 104.54 107.21
Table 4: Difference dTs between the average payoff of the informed and the uninformed.
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According to Hypothesis H3, in treatment C the difference between the average payoff of
an informed and the average payoff of an uninformed trader should be larger in HL than in
HH. Since the actual payoff difference is only 9.29 ECU in HH and 90.32 ECU in HL, there
is clear evidence in that respect. Also, it is hypothesized that the difference in both HL and
LH is larger for treatment C than for treatment B. The actual difference in HL is 75.35
ECU for treatment B and 90.32 ECU for treatment C. In LH, the actual difference is 59.83
ECU for treatment B and 104.54 ECU for treatment C. This data is therefore consistent
with our hypothesis. We can also see that dTs is lowest in state HH in treatment C and in
state LH in treatment B, two instances for which we have seen substantial convergence to the
rational expectations equilibrium. The underlying intuition is that due to this information
dissemination, insiders gain less from their private information (relative to other states). And,
finally, the highest dTs correspond to the states LH and LL in treatment C. The price at the
end of the trading period is in these two situations even above the unconditional expected
dividend of 100 ECU, which suggest that insiders profit from these high prices.
We formally test the within-treatments comparisons of Hypothesis H3 with the help of
the following econometric model:
yikr = β0+β1·DivBHighkr+β2·Typeikr+β3·DivBHighkr×Typeikr+β4·Repetitionkr+γ·Xi+εikr,
(3)
where yikr is the payoff of subject i from group k in trading round r, Type is a dummy variable
(1 if subject i from group k is an insider in round r and 0 otherwise), and X is a vector of
personal characteristics obtained from the ex post questionnaire. To be more concrete, X is
composed of four different variables: Gender (1 for males and 0 for females), HL corresponds
to the number of risky B choices in the Holt-Laury lottery task, CRT indicates the number of
correct answers in the cognitive reflection test, and RL is the number of correct answers in
the risk literacy test. The variables DivBHigh and Repetition are defined exactly as before
in equations (1) and (2). It is important to note that for a given treatment (treatment C
or treatment B) and for a given dividend of asset A (high or low), the interaction variable
DivBHigh × Type captures the diff-in-diff comparisons of Hypothesis H3. The estimation
results are presented in Table 5.
We can first see that Type is highly significant in all four estimations; that is, private
information is valuable in the sense that an informed subject earns on average significantly







LL are all significantly greater than zero, which coincides with our
insights from Table 4. In order to compare the average payoff of an informed trader with that
of an uninformed trader for a high asset B dividend, we consider the ex post regression test




Treatment C Treatment B
HH vs HL LH vs LL HH vs HL LH vs LL
Intercept (β0) 590.319
∗∗∗ 83.195 548.270∗∗∗ 173.103∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.297) (0.000) (0.000)
DivBHigh (β1) 21.810
∗∗∗ 3.697 −5.474 9.225
(0.008) (0.843) (0.675) (0.604)
Type (β2) 87.222
∗∗∗ 116.428∗∗∗ 80.478∗∗∗ 85.445∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.027)
DivBHigh × Type (β3) −72.594∗∗∗ −11.877 −1.152 −25.231
(0.007) (0.875) (0.973) (0.647)
Repetition (β4) −0.352 0.127 0.993 0.414
(0.509) (0.918) (0.267) (0.562)
Gender (γ1) −4.444 37.017 34.001 30.671
(0.863) (0.553) (0.175) (0.223)
HL (γ2) −8.518 14.306 −3.697 −0.969
(0.347) (0.359) (0.185) (0.732)
CRT (γ3) 12.931 9.494 19.496
∗∗∗ −10.336
(0.522) (0.707) (0.000) (0.545)
RL (γ4) 9.998 −14.327 13.110 −3.299
(0.292) (0.760) (0.117) (0.849)
Observations 360 360 410 310
Table 5: OLS regression results on payoffs (within-treatments comparisons). In parenthesis, we report
two-sided p-values. *** means statistically significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Standard errors are
clustered at the group level k.
first column of Table 5), 0.0786 for dCHL (second column), 0.0058 for d
B
HH (third column),
and 0.0307 for dBLL (last column). We can observe that the p-value is largest in state HH of
treatment C, which corresponds to the smallest number in Table 4. Perhaps surprisingly, the
average payoff difference of 90.32 ECU in state HL of treatment C is only significant at the
10% level; see Table 4. All this implies that private information is generally valuable.
Second, and as it has been hypothesized, payoffs do not depend on the dividend of asset B
in the treatment B. Most importantly, as this directly relates to the first part of Hypothesis
H3, it turns out that β3 is not significantly different from 0 in the last three columns of the
table. But, the result is even stronger because neither the payoff of the uninformed nor the
payoff of the informed varies in the dividend of asset B in this treatment: (a) the payoff of the
uninformed in state HH is not significantly different from that in HL (β̂1 = −5.474 in the
third column with an associated two-sided p-value of 0.675), (b) the payoff of the uninformed
in state LH is not significantly different from that in state LL (β̂1 = 9.225 in the fourth
column with an associated two-sided p-value of 0.604), (c) in the third column the two-sided
p-value of the linear hypothesis that β1 + β3 = 0, which compares the average payoff of the
informed in state HH with that in state HL, equals 0.766, and (d) we cannot reject that the
informed earn on average the same in state LH as in state LL since the two-sided p-value of
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the corresponding test is 0.677. Finally, regarding the individual characteristics, for treatment
B, we find that subjects with higher attention level, measured through a higher score in the
cognitive reflection test, have a higher payoff if the dividend of asset A is high.
Third, the results from treatment C are also in line with Hypothesis H3. The variable
DivBHigh × Type is highly significant in the first column (the sign is negative), but it is not
significant in the second column. This means that in this treatment, the payoff difference
between the informed and the uninformed is significantly smaller in state HH than in state
HL and that the payoff difference between the two groups cannot be rejected to be the same
for LH and LL. The negative sign of β̂3 in the first column is due to two components:
the average payoff of the uninformed is significantly higher in state HH than in state HL
(β̂1 is positive and DivBHigh is highly significant), while the average payoff of the informed
is significantly smaller in state HH than in state HL (the two-sided p-value of the linear
hypothesis that β1 + β3 = 0 is 0.007). With respect to the case when asset A pays a low
dividend (the second column), we find that the payoff of neither of the two groups varies in the
dividend of asset B. There is no significant payoff difference for the uninformed (β̂1 = 3.697
with a two-sided p-value of 0.843) and there is no significant difference for the informed either,
as the two-sided p-value of the linear hypothesis that β1 + β3 = 0 is 0.890. Finally, none of
the individual characteristics elicited in the ex post questionnaire is significantly predictive
for payoffs in treatment C.














We conclude our analysis by analyzing for each of the four states whether payoffs differ be-
tween treatments. For that, we only have to substitute in equation (3) the variable DivBHigh
by TreatmentC. The results are displayed in Table 6.
Hypothesis H3 suggested that two of the four between-treatment comparisons should
be significant: in states HL and LH, the payoff difference between the informed and the
uninformed should be larger in treatment C than in treatment B. That is, we expect the
interaction variable TreatmentC × Type to be positive and significant in the second and the
third column. Even though β̂3 is positive in the second and the third column, we cannot
reject that β3 is equal to zero (the two-sided p-value is 0.760 in the second and 0.425 in the
third column). However, TreatmentC×Type is significant at the 10% level in the first column
(the sign is negative); that is, in state HH the difference between the average payoff of the
informed and the uninformed is lower in treatment C than in treatment B. This is consistent
with Figure 2, where we can observe that for state HH, the average price path in treatment
C lies always above that in treatment B. Since the informed are expected to buy shares from
the uninformed in this instance, the informed have to pay higher prices for their shares in
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State
HH HL LH LL
Intercept (β0) 572.348
∗∗∗ 554.057∗∗∗ 171.111∗∗∗ 151.984∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TreatmentC (β1) 18.031 −16.069 −8.683 −17.831
(0.148) (0.157) (0.611) (0.365)
Type (β2) 79.227
∗∗∗ 75.544∗∗∗ 57.673∗∗ 87.869∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.010)
TreatmentC × Type (β3) −69.249∗ 9.300 49.386 32.347
(0.072) (0.760) (0.425) (0.503)
Repetition (β4) −0.669 2.387 0.085 −1.948
(0.364) (0.135) (0.886) (0.476)
Gender (γ1) 18.696 12.351 4.673 66.440
(0.314) (0.545) (0.742) (0.279)
HL (γ2) −6.507∗ −3.329 2.808 0.218
(0.089) (0.201) (0.423) (0.974)
CRT (γ3) 10.342 27.226
∗∗ −30.218∗∗∗ 25.428
(0.254) (0.028) (0.000) (0.221)
RL (γ4) 13.088 9.005 17.746
∗∗ −28.631
(0.132) (0.273) (0.023) (0.460)
Observations 360 360 410 310
Table 6: OLS regression results on payoffs (between-treatments comparisons). In parenthesis, we
report two-sided p-values. *** means statistically significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Standard
errors are clustered at the group level k.
treatment C in comparison with treatment B, which reduces the informational advantage.4
With respect to the personal characteristics, we find that subjects who choose the risky B
option in the Holt-Laury lottery task more often earn less in state HH at the 10% significance
level. Perhaps surprisingly, subjects with a higher score in the cognitive reflection test have a
higher payoff in state HL but a lower payoff in state LH. Maybe one would expect that more
attentive subjects perform better in all states. Finally, subjects with more correct answers in
the risk literacy test have a higher payoff in state LH.










Although the within-treatments comparisons in Result R3 are completely in line with Hy-
pothesis H3, some divergence is found with respect to the between-treatments comparisons.
In states HL and LH, the payoff difference between the average payoff of an informed trader
4One can check again whether each single dTs in Table 5 is significantly different from zero. Since β2 is
significantly greater than zero in all four estimations, this is straightforward to see for treatment B. For
treatment C, we have to test again whether β2 + β3 = 0. The two-sided p-values are 0.6977 for state HH,
0.0002 in state HL, 0.0535 in state LH, and 0.0008 in state LL. It worth noting that dCHL is now greater than
zero at the 1% significance level, while before it was so only at the 10% significance level.
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and the average payoff of an uninformed trader was expected to be larger in treatment C
than in treatment B. The data hints in that direction, yet the treatment difference is not
significant in Result R4. This means that in state HL, the informed are not buying shares
from the uninformed in treatment C at cheaper prices than in treatment B. Also, in state
LH, the informed are not selling shares to the uninformed in treatment C at higher prices
than in treatment B. The significant price difference between the two treatments according
to Result R2 in each of these two states should thus rather be assigned to trades among the
uninformed.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have studied experimentally in the laboratory the effects of a correlated asset
structure between two separated markets on the market’s capacity to incorporate private
information. Our main finding is that the correlated asset structure worsens information
dissemination. If the dividend of asset A is high, prices are the same in both treatments
whenever the dividend of asset B is high (state HH) but prices are significantly lower, and
therefore further away from the rational expectations equilibrium, under the correlated asset
structure whenever the dividend of asset B is low (state HL). And, if the dividend of asset
A is low, prices are the same in both treatments whenever the dividend of asset B is low
(state LL) but prices are significantly higher, and therefore further away from the rational
expectations equilibrium, under the correlated asset structure if the dividend of asset A is
high (state LH). In particular, as Figure 2 shows, the treatment difference for a low asset
A dividend is substantial. One can thus conclude that the simple spot market does not
work as intended even in this most basic setting and it seems necessary to explore whether
a market redesign, for example by introducing state contingent claims or derivatives, can
sufficiently alleviate the problem. Introducing short-sales should bring prices closer to the
rational expectations equilibrium in states LH and LL, but cannot be expected to revert our
results for state HL because the informed are on the buying side of the market. The extra sell
pressure would come from the uninformed (at a substantial risk) pushing prices, if anything,
further away from the rational expectations equilibrium.
One main feature of the experimental design is that trading takes place sequentially,
meaning that asset A can only be traded after market B has closed. Traders in market A
observe all past prices of asset B and form on the basis of this information a subjective belief
about the actual dividend of asset B. This design could be associated with the situation
when there is a single economy and the output today (asset A) depends on the output from
yesterday (asset B). In that interpretation our results refer to temporal spillover effects. In
a different design, trading takes place simultaneously. Traders in market A would then be
able to react instantaneously to price swings in market B, providing an even richer data set.
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This alternative design could be associated with the situation when there are two economies,
one bigger economy (asset B) and a smaller economy (asset A) that depends on the bigger
economy; that is, this design has applications in the analysis of cross-country spillovers.
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A Subject pool information
Table 7 presents the characteristics of the mean participant for each of the treatments.5 The
variable ‘HL’ counts the number of risky choices participants made in the Holt-Laury test.
The variables ‘CRT’ and ‘RL’ count the number of correct answers participants gave to the
questions in the cognitive reflection and the risk literacy tests.
Country A
Country B Baseline Correlated
Gender (1 = male) 0.5333 0.4655 0.6167
HL (0–10) 4.3333 4.2586 4.6000
CRT (0–3) 1.1333 0.7241 1.0333
RL (0–4) 1.1333 1.0690 1.1833
Table 7: Participant characteristics across treatments.
While the averages reported for the two Country A treatments may indicate differences in
the respective participant pools, only for CRT the difference is close to significant (Wilcoxon:
p = 0.0731; p > .1 for others).
There is a slight correlation between gender and risky behavior: females make more risky
choices (Spearman: ρ̂ = −0.1547; p = 0.0605). Males answer more questions correct in the
CRT (Spearman: ρ̂ = 0.1748, p = 0.0336), but there is no gender difference in the number of
correct answer in the risk literacy test (Spearman: ρ̂ = 0.0987, p = 0.2328).
Not unexpectedly, there is a positive correlation between the number of questions that
participants answer correctly in the two tests (Spearman: ρ̂ = 0.2803, p = 0.0006). There is no
correlation between either test and the number of risky choices participants make (Spearman:
ρ̂ = −0.0322, p = 0.6978; ρ̂ = −0.0613, p = 0.4589).
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Figure 3: Price paths of market B. Gray dots correspond to contract prices when the fundamental
value is low, and black dots correspond to contract prices when the fundamental value is high.
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C − G 5 − R 09 − HL C − G 5 − R 10 − LH C − G 5 − R 11 − LH C − G 5 − R 12 − LH
C − G 5 − R 05 − LH C − G 5 − R 06 − LH C − G 5 − R 07 − LH C − G 5 − R 08 − HH
C − G 5 − R 01 − LL C − G 5 − R 02 − LL C − G 5 − R 03 − HL C − G 5 − R 04 − LH
















C − G 6 − R 09 − LL C − G 6 − R 10 − HL C − G 6 − R 11 − HL C − G 6 − R 12 − HH
C − G 6 − R 05 − HL C − G 6 − R 06 − HH C − G 6 − R 07 − LL C − G 6 − R 08 − LL
C − G 6 − R 01 − HH C − G 6 − R 02 − HH C − G 6 − R 03 − HH C − G 6 − R 04 − LL













Group 5 Group 6
Figure 4: Price paths of market A in treatment C. The last element in the top boxes refers to the
state (for instance, HL refers to the state where the dividend of asset A is high while that of asset B
is low).
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B − G 1 − R 09 − HH B − G 1 − R 10 − HH B − G 1 − R 11 − HL B − G 1 − R 12 − HH
B − G 1 − R 05 − LL B − G 1 − R 06 − LH B − G 1 − R 07 − HL B − G 1 − R 08 − HL
B − G 1 − R 01 − HL B − G 1 − R 02 − HH B − G 1 − R 03 − LL B − G 1 − R 04 − HL













B − G 2 − R 09 − LL B − G 2 − R 10 − LH B − G 2 − R 11 − LH B − G 2 − R 12 − LH
B − G 2 − R 05 − LH B − G 2 − R 06 − HH B − G 2 − R 07 − LH B − G 2 − R 08 − HH
B − G 2 − R 01 − HL B − G 2 − R 02 − HL B − G 2 − R 03 − HL B − G 2 − R 04 − LH
















Group 1 Group 2
B − G 3 − R 09 − HL B − G 3 − R 10 − LL B − G 3 − R 11 − HL B − G 3 − R 12 − LH
B − G 3 − R 05 − HL B − G 3 − R 06 − HH B − G 3 − R 07 − HL B − G 3 − R 08 − LL
B − G 3 − R 01 − HH B − G 3 − R 02 − LH B − G 3 − R 03 − LH B − G 3 − R 04 − HL













B − G 4 − R 09 − HH B − G 4 − R 10 − HH B − G 4 − R 11 − HL B − G 4 − R 12 − HH
B − G 4 − R 05 − LL B − G 4 − R 06 − HH B − G 4 − R 07 − LL B − G 4 − R 08 − LL
B − G 4 − R 01 − LL B − G 4 − R 02 − LH B − G 4 − R 03 − LL B − G 4 − R 04 − HL













Group 3 Group 4
B − G 5 − R 09 − HL B − G 5 − R 10 − LH B − G 5 − R 11 − HH B − G 5 − R 12 − HH
B − G 5 − R 05 − HH B − G 5 − R 06 − LH B − G 5 − R 07 − HH B − G 5 − R 08 − LH
B − G 5 − R 01 − LL B − G 5 − R 02 − HL B − G 5 − R 03 − LL B − G 5 − R 04 − LH
















B − G 6 − R 09 − HL B − G 6 − R 10 − HL B − G 6 − R 11 − LL B − G 6 − R 12 − HH
B − G 6 − R 05 − HL B − G 6 − R 06 − LH B − G 6 − R 07 − HL B − G 6 − R 08 − LL
B − G 6 − R 01 − LH B − G 6 − R 02 − HH B − G 6 − R 03 − HH B − G 6 − R 04 − HL
















Group 5 Group 6
Figure 5: Price paths of market A in treatment B. The last element in the top boxes refers to the
state (for instance, HL refers to the state where the dividend of asset A is high while that of asset B
is low).
27
C Instructions (Treatment C: Correlation)
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
(A) Welcome
We start by reading the instructions together. At any time, if you have any question, please
raise your hand silently and we will answer you individually.
Introduction:
For approximately two hours, you participate in a paid experiment. It is important that you
pay close attention to the instructions, as your earnings will depend on your decisions. Make
sure you understand each page of the instructions before proceeding, as it will not be possible
to go back.
Please, note that in the experiment you will not be deceived in any way, as this is strictly
prohibited in economics experiments.
Make sure your cell phone is turned off and that there are no personal items on your desk.
Also be sure not to communicate with the other participants in the room, or distract them
in any way. If you do not abide by these basic rules, we will have to ask you to leave the
experiment and you will not receive any monetary compensation.
Payments:
The experiment is divided into 12 identical rounds. At the end of the experiment, you will
be paid for the accumulated earnings in the 12 rounds, in addition to the participation fee of
6 Euro. Losses may be incurred in some rounds, but it should not be too difficult to make up
for them via profits in other rounds. During the experiment, the earnings will be expressed
in ECU. At the end of the experiment, you will receive 2.50 Euro for every 1,000 ECUs.
Questionnaire:
At the end of the experiment, we will ask you to answer a short questionnaire.
(B) Main structure of the experiment
1. Economic environment:
There are two countries: Country A and Country B. In each country, there is a market
in which shares of an asset can be bought and sold. Shares of Asset A are traded in
Market A located in Country A. And, shares of Asset B are traded in Market B located
in Country B. You are located in Country A and you can only buy and sell shares of
Asset A. Participants located in Country B can only trade shares of Asset B.
Shareholders receive dividends after the markets close. The actual dividends are deter-




Dividend of a share of Asset B 150 ECU 50 ECU
Probability 50% (5 out of 10) 50% (5 out of 10)
Country A
State X Y
Dividend of a share of Asset A 150 ECU 50 ECU
Probability if the state of Country B is W 70% (7 out of 10) 30% (3 out of 10)
Probability if the state of Country B is Z 30% (3 out of 10) 70% (7 out of 10)
The state of Country B can be W or Z. If the state of Country B is W, each share of
Asset B pays its owner a dividend of 150 ECU after Market B closes. If the state of
Country B is Z, the dividend is 50 ECU. The probability that the state of Country B
is W is 50%.
The state of Country A can be X or Y. If the state of Country A is X, each share of
Asset A pays its owner a dividend of 150 ECU after Market A closes. If the state of
Country A is Y, the dividend is 50 ECU. If the state of Country B is W, the probability
that the state of Country A is X is 70%. And, if the state of Country B is Z, the
probability that the state of Country A is X is 30%. Therefore, the state of Country A
depends on the state of Country B.
2. Matching:
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer randomly matches you with 9 other
participants in this session to form a group of 10. Your group does not change through-
out the experiment and there are no interactions with other groups that are formed in
this session. All groups in this session operate only in Market A.
3. Endowments:
At the start of each round, each member of your group receives 4 shares of Asset A.
Therefore, in each round, there are 40 shares of Asset A available in your group. Each
member of your group receives in each round also an interest-free loan of 6,000 ECU
that can be used to buy shares of Asset A from other members of the group. The loan
is returned automatically at the end of each round.
4. Private information:
When Market A opens for buying and selling, 3 randomly selected members of your
group are informed about the actual state of Country A; that is, these 3 members will
know whether the current state of country A is X or whether the state in country A is
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Y. The other 7 members do not receive any information related to the state of Country
A. Market A remains open for 4 minutes (240 seconds).
5. Earnings:
After Market A has closed, but before the next round starts, you are informed about the
actual state of both countries, and about your earnings in the current round. Earnings
are calculated as follows:
number of shares of Asset A×dividend per share (in ECU)+cash (in ECU)−6,000 ECU.
In the next round, the state of the two countries are determined randomly again. The
3 members of your group who receive information about the actual state of Country A
are also randomly selected again. You also start again with 4 shares of Asset A and
with an interest-free loan of 6,000 ECU.
(C) The trading interface
1. General information:
At the top of the screen you find the following information: the current round (on the
left), the time that the market still remains open (in the middle), and your accumulated
earnings so far (on the right).
2. Tables / private information / inventory:
Below the top and on the right, you find the tables with the possible states of the
country, your private information, and your current inventory. If you are one of the 3
members of the group with private information, you will see the actual state of Country
A (X or Y). If you are not one of the 3 informed members, you will see the message “no
private information”. The inventory indicates the number of shares of Asset A and the
cash you have at present.
3. Buying and selling:
The market allows traders to simultaneously buy and sell shares. A sell order or ask
is the amount of ECU at which you are willing to sell one share of Asset A. A buy
order or bid is the amount of ECU for which you are willing to buy one share of Asset
A. To send a buy or sell order to the system, you just have to enter your price in the
corresponding field and press the SUBMIT button.
If you have an open order in the market and you decide to place a new order, then
the price at which you are willing to trade is updated. That is, after submitting a new
order, the previous order is automatically deleted.
Just above the part where you enter your sell orders, you find the list of all current
sell orders in your group (including yours that is marked with an asterisk). They are
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ordered from lowest to highest. Also, just above the part where you enter your buy
orders, you find the list of all current buy orders in your group (including yours that is
marked with an asterisk). These are ordered from highest to lowest.
The system does not allow you to enter a new sell order once you have sold your last
share. On the other hand, the 6,000 ECU interest-free loan provides you with enough
cash so that you can always buy an additional share. The minimum price of an order
(either bid or ask) is 50 ECU. The maximum price of an order is 150 ECU. The system
does not allow your bid to exceed your ask. It is not possible to delete open sell orders,
but you can always enter an ask price of 150 ECU, which has a similar effect. Similarly,
you can always enter a bid price of 50 ECU.
4. Market A graph:
If the bid price of one member of the group exceeds the ask price of another member,
a share is exchanged. The transaction is settled at the price that was first placed in
the market. For example, if the bid price of the first member is 100 ECU and then the
second member of the group enters an ask price of 80 ECU, then the transaction price
is 100 ECU. If the second member had entered his ask price of 80 ECU before the bid
price of 100 ECU of the first member, then the price of the transaction would have been
80 ECU.
The transaction prices in your group are displayed in the graph “Market A”. The x-axis
indicates the time elapsed in the round and the y-axis the prices of Asset A. This graph
is updated every time a transaction takes place. The graph only appears after the first
transaction; that is, the corresponding space on the screen is left empty at the beginning
of the round.
5. Market B graph:
The evolution of transaction prices of Asset B is visualized in a similar way in the graph
“Market B” and will appear next to the graph of Market A.
(D) Implementation of Market B
How Market B operates is detailed below.
The Market B implementation is similar to that of Market A in the following
aspects:
• A fixed group of 10 participants trades shares of Asset B for 12 rounds.
• 3 of the 10 members in the group are informed about the actual state of Country B
(and the other 7 members do not receive any information).
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• Each participant located in Country B starts each round with 4 shares of Asset B and
an interest-free loan of 6,000 ECU.
• Traders can buy and sell shares of Asset B for 4 minutes using the same procedures as
in this session.
• Participants are informed about the actual state of Country B and their earnings at the
end of each round.
The key differences between Country B and Country A are:
• The state of Country B does not depend on the state of Country A.
• Although the prices of Asset B are observed in your Country A, participants in Market
B do not observe the prices of Asset A.
All participants in the current session are trading in Country A. Markets for Country B have
been run in a previous experimental session. Therefore, the prices of Asset B that you are
going to observe are real. At the moment Market A opens for a new round of trading, the
graph for Market B will show all the transactions of the corresponding round in Country B.
That is, Market B has already closed from the point of view of a participant in Market A and
prices in this Market B are observable, but the actual state of Country B has not yet been
disclosed.
In addition, as indicated, the state of Country A depends on the state of Country B, and the
state of Country B has already been determined in an earlier session. Finally, none of the
participants in the current session has participated in the session for Country B.
(E) To close
Practice round:
To familiarize you with the trading platform, there is a practice round that will not be taken
into account for your final payment. No graph of Market B is shown in the practice round.
Further, no member in your group receives information about the actual state in Country A.
Control questions:
Before the practice round starts, we ask you to answer some control questions.
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*****
in this box the price path
for market B was presented
*****
D Control questions
1. In which market are you trading?
(a) Only in Market A
(b) Only in Market B
(c) Market A and B
2. Are there participants who can trade in Market A and Market B at the same time?
(a) Yes
(b) No
3. Suppose that the state in Country B is W. What is the probability that the state in























7. Dividends of Asset A are paid before Market A closes.
(a) True
(b) False
8. All members in your group are informed about the actual state of Country A at the
end of each round.
(a) True
(b) False
9. If the actual state of Country A in the first round is X, then the probability increases
that the actual state in the second round is Y.
(a) True
(b) False
10. The earnings in one round can be used in subsequent rounds to buy shares of Asset A.
(a) True
(b) False
11. Shares bought in one round can be sold in subsequent rounds.
(a) True
(b) False
12. You have to pay back the interest-free loan of 6,000 ECU at the end of each round.
(a) True
(b) False
13. If you buy two shares for 80 ECU each and sell one share for 120 ECU, what are your







14. Once Market A opens, what can you do?
(a) I can only buy shares of Asset A
(b) I can only sell shares of Asset A
(c) I can buy and sell shares of Asset A
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(d) None of the above answers is correct
15. Is it possible to have two open sell orders at the same time?
(a) Yes
(b) No
16. Can you see all open orders in your group while trading the market?
(a) Yes
(b) No
17. Do you receive graphical information on all transaction prices in Market A?
(a) Yes
(b) No








Thank you very much for participating in this experiment. We finish the session with a short
questionnaire that takes about 10 minutes to answer. You can earn some extra money in most
of the questions. To avoid delays in this final part, the experiment automatically advances
when the remaining time indicated at the top of the screen reaches 0. If the time is up and
you have not pressed the button to continue, your answer will not be saved. In this case, you
will not receive the money associated with the question even if your answer is correct.
Screen 1
Please, indicate your gender.
(a) Male
(b) Female
(c) Neither male nor female
Screen 2
Consider two options A and B. Each has two possible payoffs: a high one or a low one. The
high payoff for option A is 2 Euro and the low payoff is 1.60 Euro. The high payoff
for option B is 3.85 Euro and the low payoff is 0.10 Euro. Each of the 10 rows below
shows a different probability of winning each payoff. Indicate your preferred option in each
of the 10 cases. The computer will randomly choose one of the 10 rows and accordingly
determine the payoff to be high or low. You receive the resulting monetary payoff.
10% for the high payoff and 90% for the low payoff: A ◦ ◦ B
20% for the high payoff and 80% for the low payoff: A ◦ ◦ B
30% for the high payoff and 70% for the low payoff: A ◦ ◦ B
40% for the high payoff and 60% for the low payoff: A ◦ ◦ B
50% for the high payoff and 50% for the low payoff: A ◦ ◦ B
60% for the high payoff and 40% for the low payoff: A ◦ ◦ B
70% for the high payoff and 30% for the low payoff: A ◦ ◦ B
80% for the high payoff and 20% for the low payoff: A ◦ ◦ B
90% for the high payoff and 10% for the low payoff: A ◦ ◦ B
100% for the high payoff and 0% for the low payoff: A ◦ ◦ B
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Screen 3
Please answer the following questions. You receive 0.20 Euro for each correct answer.
1. A bat and a ball cost 1.10 Euro in total. The bat costs 1 Euro more than the ball. How





2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines





3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to






Please answer the following questions. You receive 0.20 Euro for each correct answer.
1. Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these 50 throws




(d) None of the above answers is correct
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2. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500
members in the choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in the choir





(d) None of the above answers is correct
3. Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides). The probability that the die shows a
6 is twice as high as the probability of each of the other numbers. On average, out of




(d) None of the above answers is correct
4. In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown and 30% white. A red mushroom is
poisonous with a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is poisonous with a





(d) None of the above answers is correct
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